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ABSTRACT: In the Spring Quarter of the 2005 Academic Year, the Naval Postgraduate School introduced a new 
course to focus on Modeling and Simulation for Military Operations Other Than War.  The course was designed to 
present and discover issues, challenges, and opportunities for application of modeling and simulation (M&S) to 
Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW).  Students were given hands-on experience with a number of current 
and emerging M&S simulations and computational tools relevant to MOOTW.  This paper describes the nature and 
general content of the course, with identification of the specific models/tools introduced in the instruction and a 
summary of MOOTW M&S requirements, issues, and lessons learned from class discussions and student activities. 
 
                                                          
1 Portions of this report have been published in the Proceedings of the 2005 Interservice/Industry Training, 
Simulation, and Education Conference (I/ITSEC). [1] 
1. Introduction 
 
Increasing demands are being placed on the military to 
perform operations beyond traditional warfare. The 
conduct of Military Operations Other Than War 
(MOOTW) brings numerous challenges to US military 
forces – challenges that are unique to conducting 
operations short of war. These challenges manifest 
themselves in a number of ways including the 
multidimensional nature of MOOTW and the 
increasing frequency of their occurrence. Political 
considerations in MOOTW permeate all levels, from 
strategic to tactical. This greater sensitivity to political 
considerations stems from the goals of MOOTW to 
preempt, prevent, or limit potential hostilities. The 
scope of military operations conducted in MOOTW 
may involve elements of both combat and non-combat 
operations in peacetime, conflict or war situations. 
Since MOOTW focuses on deterring war, resolving 
conflict, promoting peace and supporting civil 
authorities, US forces may be called upon to perform 
various types of operations. Finally, military forces 
conducting MOOTW are often in a supporting rather 
than a lead roll – whether conducting MOOTW abroad 
or domestically, the military is only one partner of 
many, interacting with governmental and 
nongovernmental agencies. 
 
As in Bosnia and Kosovo, and most recently 
Afghanistan and Iraq, MOOTW often encompasses 
open-ended missions unrelated to traditional military 
core competencies. The nature of MOOTW presents 
the military with unique challenges in planning, 
analysis, decision support, rehearsal, and training. 
M&S management and development communities are 
placing increasing attention to modeling non-
traditional warfighting, most notably with operations in 
urban terrain. Whereas simulation systems over the 
past several decades have struggled with appropriate 
representation of combat on land, sea, and air, 
MOOTW presents even greater challenges regarding 
what to model in the modern battlespace and how to 
model the modern battlespace. A critical study of M&S 
capabilities to deal with MOOTW requirements is 
needed.  
 
To address this need, and under the sponsorship of the 
Defense Modeling and Simulation Office (DMSO), the 
Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) introduced a new 
course into the Modeling, Virtual Environments, and 
Simulation (MOVES) curriculum in the Spring Quarter 
of the 2005 Academic Year (April-June 2005). The 
course was titled “Modeling and Simulation for 
Military Operations Other Than War” and hoped to 
leverage the unique backgrounds of NPS students who 
directly face these real-world operations. This paper 
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describes the nature and general content of the course, 
with identification of specific models and tools 
introduced in the instruction and a summary of 
MOOTW M&S requirements, issues, and lessons 
learned from class discussions and student activities 
during the quarter. 
 
1.1 Course Description 
 
The course was designed to present and discover 
issues, challenges, and opportunities for application of 
modeling and simulation (M&S) to Military Operations 
Other Than War. The course considered application of 
M&S for MOOTW from the perspectives of analysis, 
training, acquisition, and mission planning/rehearsal. 
Students were given hands-on experience with a 
number of current and emerging M&S simulations and 
computational tools relevant to MOOTW.  
 
The course was presented as a series of lectures and 
open discussions with a significant portion of time in a 
laboratory setting devoted to learning, exercising, and 
assessing a number of tools sponsored by DMSO and 
the US Marine Corps. Grading was primarily based on 
an end-of-quarter project involving student 
presentation of the design and analysis of a relevant 
mission using one or more of the available tools. Work 
conducted in the course is summarized in this paper. 
More detailed descriptions of student project work are 
provided in a separate set of papers prepared by the 
students for future course use and possible publication. 
 
Necessary software and reading materials were 
provided by the instructor or made available online for 
download. The only prerequisite for the course was an 
intense interest in making M&S relevant to today’s 
warfighters! 
 
1.2 Class Composition 
 
Besides being a leading academic institution in the 
conduct of military research with over $100M in 
research funding each year, a unique quality of NPS is 
the diversity of its student population. Of the 1,552 
students enrolled in the school for Academic Year 
2005, 1,257 were US military (687 Navy, 117 Army, 
214 Air Force, 6 Coast Guard, and 196 Marine Corps) 
and DoD civilians (37) and 295 were foreign military 
and civilians representing 60 different countries. Table 
1 provides a summary of the composition of the M&S 
for MOOTW class roster. The course was primarily 
advertised to students from the Information Science, 
C4I, Computer Science, Operations Research (OR), 
Operational Logistics (OL), and MOVES curricula. 
The make-up of the class was a good representation of 
the diversity found at NPS.    
 
Table 1. Student Ranks, Nationalities, and Services 
Represented in the M&S for MOOTW Course. 
Rank Service Country Curriculum 
MAJ(2) Army US MOVES 
MAJ Army US OR 
CPT Army US MOVES 
Command  
SgtMaj 
Army US MOVES 
LCDR Navy US OR 







1LT Army Turkey MOVES 
LT Navy Germany MOVES 
Maj Air Force Tunisia MOVES 
Civilian -- Norway OR 
 
2. Tools Explored 
 
A major challenge in conducting the course was 
providing the students an opportunity to not just hear 
about a number of current models dealing with 
MOOTW issues, but to also permit them significant 
hands-on experience operating the tools. This entailed 
a significant amount of instructional time introducing 
model capabilities through demonstrations and 
structured training (when such materials were 
available). It was not possible to achieve full 
proficiency in application of the models in the time 
available in the course (a total of 44 hours of 
instruction time and 11 hours of laboratory time). For 
example, the Training Plan for DMSO’s MOOTW 
Flexible Asymmetric Simulation Technologies (FAST) 
Toolbox [2] estimates instruction time to achieve basic 
familiarization with tool capabilities at 88 hours (160 
hours to reach proficiency in use) for the Diplomatic 
and Military Operations in a Non-warfighting Domain 
(DIAMOND) model and 8 hours (24 hours to reach 
proficiency in use) for the Interim Semi-static Stability 
Model (ISSM). Student selection of a particular model 
for use in their final project permitted additional time 
for them to develop stronger skills with a specific 
model at their own pace. 
 
2.1 Interim Semi-static Stability Model 
Inspired by Hayes and Sands’ book Doing Windows: 
Non-Traditional Military Responses to Complex 
Emergencies [3], the Interim Semi-static Stability 
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Model (ISSM) was developed as a civil stability and 
durable peace model that provides values for a set of 
factors within a single country.[4] [5] Applicable at the 
strategic and operational levels of war, this model uses 
approximately 200 variables in an Excel spreadsheet to 
assess the state of the operational area. Given its 
capacity to store up to 73 iterations specified at a point 
in time (e.g., to capture more than 1.4 year’s worth of 
data if done at weekly intervals), the variables promote 
linkage to unified joint and service task lists as well as 
COCOM’s mission essential tasks for identification of 
priority information requirements (PIR) and 
commander’s critical information requirements 
(CCIR).  
As shown in Figure 1, the ISSM depicts the 
complexities associated with OOTW by combining 
observations of aspects of the external situation (i.e., 
social, economic, cultural, civil law enforcement, 
media, etc.) into a unified picture of effects of what has 
gone right as well as graphically portraying trends of 
what has gone wrong.  
 
 
Figure 1. Interim Semi-static Stability Model (ISSM) 
 
2.2 Diplomatic and Military Operations in a Non-
warfighting Domain 
 
The Diplomatic and Military Operations in a Non-
warfighting Domain (DIAMOND) model was 
developed by the United Kingdom Defence Science & 
Technology Laboratory.[6] [7]  DIAMOND is a high-
level model designed to focus on OOTW and examine 
issues arising from asymmetric relationships, 
operations and threats. A fast running, stochastic, 
object-oriented simulation, DIAMOND models 
multiple independent sides, each with its own plans, 
perceptions and behaviors.  
 
As depicted in Figure 2, the operational theatre is 
depicted as a simple arc and node network that may be 
viewed over a bitmap representation of the geography 
of interest. The simulation can run at slow speeds to 
facilitate visualization and demonstration of situation 
dynamics or at high speed for rapid data generation. 
DIAMOND may also be run in background mode at 
high speed to generate statistical distributions 
supporting exploration of possible scenario outcomes 
in mission planning.  
 
The features that differentiate DIAMOND from many 
other similar simulations derive from its OOTW-
specific capabilities. In these operations, behaviors of 
military and civilians (both organized and 
unorganized) are key drivers to activities and results. 
DIAMOND incorporates such behaviors as perception, 
variable relationships between groups, and 
negotiations. The command structures and nested 
missions, when combined with dynamic event triggers, 
provides additional planning and analytical insights.  
 
Figure 2.  Diplomatic and Military Operations in a 
Non-warfighting Domain (DIAMOND) 
 
2.3 Pythagoras 
Pythagoras is an agent-based simulation created to 
support the growth and refinement of the Project 
Albert program sponsored by the US Marine Corps 
(http://www.ProjectAlbert.org).[8] Pythagoras started 
as an enhancement to the Archimedes model to enable 
execution of large problem sets on multiple platforms 
and to support analysis through data farming 
techniques using the Maui High Performance 
Computing Center (MHPCC). Specifically, the 
Pythagoras development achieved the following goals: 
• With less than 8 hours of training, the software 
can be used by a Marine History-major. 
• The software implements variables from the fuzzy 
logic trade space.  These variables should be held 
constant during a particular replicate so that cause 
and effect relationships can be developed as a 
result of data farming. 
 
 
Page 4 of 21 
• The software is data farmable; i.e., able to run on a 
distributed computer for 100,000 or more 
replicates, using Extensible Markup Language 
(XML) for input and output data. 
 
2.4 Map-Aware Non-uniform Automata 
 
The Map-Aware Non-uniform Automata (MANA) 
model was developed by New Zealand’s Defence 
Technology Agency for use as a scenario-exploring 
model to address a broad range of problems. The 
developers sought to create a model that would enable 
analysis of the value of factors like situational 
awareness, command and control, and information 
warfare that are not treated explicitly by all models. 
MANA is based on two key ideas [9]:  
• The behavior of entities within a combat model 
(both friend and foe) is a critical component of the 
analysis of the possible outcomes. 
• We are wasting our time with highly detailed 
models for determining force mixes and combat 
effectiveness. 
 
Like Project Albert, the goal is to represent the effects 
of “intangible” aspects of warfare that are too 
frequently disregarded in traditional models. 
 
2.5 Other Models and Presentations 
 
A number of other models were introduced to the class 
in special presentations: 
• EINSTein, presented by Dr. Andrew Ilachinsky 
• PAX, presented by 1LT Suat Gun, Turkish Army 
• OneSAF Objective System (OOS), presented by 
MAJ Nick Wittwer, US Army 
 
In general, the students did not have opportunity to 
work directly with these models, unless they chose to 
do so for their class projects (e.g., 1LT Gun using PAX 
and MAJ Wittwer using OOS).   
 
In addition to exposure to these tools, several guest 
lecturers brought specialized expertise to the class, 
including: 
• Dr. Tom Lucas, NPS Operations Research, on 
agent-based modeling and analysis 
• Dr. Jon Czarnecki, Naval War College, on 
asymmetric warfare 
• Dr. Susan Sanchez, NPS Operations Research, on 
statistical design of experiments for agent-based 
models 
• Capt Mike Babilot, USMC, NPS Operations 
Research Masters student, on development of 
agent-based simulation with MANA (comparison 
of a distributed operations force to a traditional 
force in urban combat) 
 
3. M&S Requirements in MOOTW 
 
As an introduction to areas of warfare that generally 
fall under the classification of Military Operations 
Other Than War, the class reviewed information from 
the Joint Publication JP 3-07.[10] This publication 
describes 16 types of operations other than war. 
Students selected an area of interest, extracted the 
applicable portion from JP 3-07, and suggested 
modeling and simulation approaches or capabilities 
needed to address that area. The following 
subparagraphs contain the student (and instructor) 
observations across 13 of the 16 types of operations 
described in JP 3-07 (types of operations not addressed 
here are Arms Control, DoD Support to Counterdrug 
Operations, and Ensuring Freedom of Navigation and 
Overflight).   
 
3.1 Combating Terrorism (MAJ Jon Ellis, US 
Army) 
 
Description from JP3-07: 
Combatting terrorism involves actions taken to 
oppose terrorism from wherever the threat. It 
includes antiterrorism (defensive measures taken 
to reduce vulnerability to terrorist acts) and 
counterterrorism (offensive measures taken to 
prevent, deter, and respond to terrorism).  
 
Antiterrorism programs form the foundation for 
effectively combating terrorism. The basics of such 
programs include training and defensive measures 
that strike a balance among the protection desired, 
the mission, infrastructure, and available 
manpower and resources. The US Government 
may provide antiterrorism assistance to foreign 
countries under the provisions of Chapter II of the 
Foreign Assistance Act of 1961. Joint Pub 3-07.2, 
“JTTP for Antiterrorism,” provides detailed 
guidance on this subject. 
 
Counterterrorism provides response measures that 
include preemptive, retaliatory, and rescue 
operations. Normally, counterterrorism operations 
require specially trained personnel capable of 
mounting swift and effective action. DOD provides 
specially trained personnel and equipment in a 
supporting role to governmental lead agencies. 
Counterterrorism is a principal special operations 
mission (see Joint Pub 3-05, “Doctrine for Joint 
Special Operations.”). Department of State (DOS), 
Department of Justice (DOJ) (specifically, the 
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Federal Bureau of Investigation), or the 
Department of Transportation (DOT) (specifically 
the Federal Aviation Administration) receive lead 
agency designation according to terrorist incident 
location and type. DOS is the lead agency for 
incidents that take place outside the United States; 
DOJ is the lead agent for incidents that occur 
within the United States; and DOT is the lead agent 
for incidents aboard aircraft “in flight” within the 
special jurisdiction of the United States. The 
Assistant to the President for National Security 
Affairs resolves any uncertainty on the designation 
of lead agency or responsibilities. 
 
M&S Considerations. There are many ways in which 
M&S can assist in planning and training to conduct 
both Antiterrorism and Counterterrorism missions. For 
Antiterrorism, one of the most difficult tasks is 
conducting Vulnerability Assessments. Conducting a 
vulnerability assessment of an Installation, an airfield, 
a ship, a building, or even “very important persons” 
(VIPs) is certainly a daunting task and one that 
requires constant vigilance to be effective. Any M&S 
tool which can minimize the responsible agent's work 
load and/or enhance their ability to harden potential 
targets would be extremely useful. Examples of useful 
tools are detailed structural models of buildings, 
stadiums, ships, Installations, airfields, or urban areas, 
and agent-based simulations which look at vulnerable 
entry points onto an installation. For Counterterrorism, 
there are many existing simulations designed to train 
this mission in any type of environment/scenario.  
 
Other Observations. It is interesting to note that Joint 
Publication 3-0 Revision First Draft (Sep 2004) [11] 
contains little to no mention of MOOTW. In fact, 
instead, there are two separate and distinct chapters 
covering the range of former MOOTW missions: one 
for Stability Operations and one for Support 
Operations. It is also interesting that the current Army 
Publication, FM 3-0 [12], also talks little of MOOTW 
and instead addresses Stability and Support Operations 
(SASO), again in two separate chapters.2 
 
3.2 Enforcement of Sanctions/Maritime Intercept 
Operations (LT Arne Baggesen, German Navy) 
 
Description from JP3-07:  
These are operations which employ coercive 
measures to interdict the movement of certain 
types of designated items into or out of a nation or 
                                                          
2 Recent DoD Directive 3000.05 now identifies this 
area of warfare as “Stability, Security, Transition, and 
Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations.” [13] 
specified area. These operations are military in 
nature and serve both political and military 
purposes. The political objective is to compel a 
country or group to conform to the objectives of 
the initiating body. The military objective is to 
establish a barrier which is selective, allowing only 
those goods authorized to enter or exit. Depending 
on geography, sanction enforcement normally 
involves some combination of air and surface 
forces. Assigned forces should be capable of 
complementary mutual support and full 
communications compatibility. An example of 
sanctions enforcement is Operation SUPPORT 
DEMOCRACY conducted off the coast of Haiti 
beginning in 1993. 
 
M&S Considerations. M&S applications can take 
place for the following aspects of Enforcement of 
Sanctions/Maritime Intercept Operations: 
 
Economic and Social Aspects: economic 
simulations of the impact of the embargo actions; 
evaluation of regional impacts of the embargo 
actions on political stability and humanitarian 
issues; evaluation of the appropriate embargo list 
to meet objectives (political pressure) without side-
effects (humanitarian, consider political 
constraints). 
 
Logistic and Detection Optimization: use by 
planning staffs for decision support and evaluation 
of force size to handle the situation; optimization 
of stationing and embargo-control-flow by 
developing control strategies; decision support for 
which kind of infrastructure object-oriented 
analysis is needed and political implications 
attached to these needs. 
 
Communication and Coordination strategies: 
virtual combined coordination exercises of allies 
for training and optimization of C4I structures; test 
of communication and coordination strategies and 
structures by simulation. 
 
Influences of Rules of Engagement (ROEs): 
evaluation of balanced ROEs to ensure control 
over escalation by theatre simulation; meet 
objectives while maintaining force protection/risk 
management and acting within political constraints. 
 
Boarding Operations Training & Risk-Assessment-
studies: boarding training in simulators and 
simulations including interactions with the boarded 
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3.3 Enforcing Exclusion Zones (Ole Sendstad, 
Civilian, Norway) 
 
Description from JP3-07: 
An exclusion zone is established by a sanctioning 
body to prohibit specified activities in a specific 
geographic area. Exclusion zones can be 
established in the air (no-fly zones), sea 
(maritime), or on land. The purpose may be to 
persuade nations or groups to modify their 
behavior to meet the desires of the sanctioning 
body or face continued imposition of sanctions, or 
use or threat of force. The measures are usually 
imposed by the UN, or other international bodies 
of which the United States is a member. However, 
they may also be imposed unilaterally by the 
United States.  
 
Exclusion zones are usually imposed due to 
breaches of international standards of human rights 
or flagrant abuse of international law regarding the 
conduct of states. Situations which may warrant 
such action include the persecution of the civil 
population by a government and deterring an 
attempt by a hostile nation to acquire territory by 
force.  
 
The sanctions may create economic, political, 
military, or other conditions where the intent is to 
change the behavior of the offending nation. 
Examples of enforcement of exclusion zones are 
Operation SOUTHERN WATCH in Iraq, initiated 
in 1992, and Operation DENY FLIGHT in Bosnia, 
initiated in 1993. 
 
Examples of the employment of exclusion zones can be 
found in the literature. In the Falklands, after 
Argentinean troops landed on April 2, 1982, the British 
Government announced the establishment of a 
Maritime Exclusion Zone (MEZ) that extended for 200 
nautical miles from the centre of the islands. After  
April 12, 1982, any Argentine warships and naval 
auxiliaries found within this zone were to be treated as 
hostile and were liable to be attacked by British 
forces.3 In Operation SOUTHERN WATCH, 
USCENTCOM established a no-fly zone south of the 
32nd parallel to monitor Iraqi compliance.4 In October 
1992, the UN established a no-fly zone over Bosnia-
Herzegovina (Operation Deny Flight). NATO AWACS 
aircraft began monitoring operations of this no-fly 
zone in October 1992. Deny Flight was a 
joint/combined airborne reconnaissance (RECCE) and 
                                                          
3 http://jcsl.oupjournals.org/cgi/reprint/8/2/363 
4 http://www.daveross.com/centcom.html 
combat air patrol (CAP) operation designed both to 
enforce the no-fly zone and to conduct strike 
operations in support of the UN peacekeeping forces.5 
 
These examples illustrate establishment of exclusion 
zones (EZ) on the sea and in the air. Land-based 
exclusion zone examples exist, but the EZ term seems 
to be rarely used for land operations. Despite this, the 
concept of exclusion zones captures the same 
principles whether they appear in air, on sea or on 
land: a geographic zone is declared within which there 
is limited access. This zone is monitored to keep track 
of movements inside the zone and in its vicinity.  
 
M&S Considerations. Analyses of such operations is 
all about estimating probability (to deny threats); i.e., 
this is the overall measure of effectiveness (MOE) in 
EZ operations. This MOE is quantitative, and relatively 
easy to deal with. The MOE is constituted of two 
subordinate MOEs: (1) the probability that the threat is 
revealed within a given time and (2) the probability 
that the threat can be denied for the given remaining 
time. Whenever dealing with this kind of operation – 
whether for training, analysis, or mission planning – 
this MOE represents the goal of Enforcing Exclusion 
Zones. 
 
Analysis of the first sub-MOE involves computation of 
cumulative detection probabilities: 
P(threat is detected within a time t) = P(t).  
 
This probability is affected by several factors: 
• density of reconnaissance platforms in the zone 
• movement pattern of the platforms 
• detection probability for a single platforms 
• density of the threatening targets (#foes / (#friends 
+ #foes)) 
 
Analysis of the second sub-MOE is about response 
time. The distance between the revealed threat and 
nearest appropriate weapon system and the speed of 
the weapon system basically define the response time. 
The distance is a result of own density of appropriate 
weapon systems. 
 
3.4 Humanitarian Assistance (Maj Mounir Sidhom, 
Tunisian Air Force) 
 
Description from JP3-07:  
Humanitarian Assistance (HA) operations relieve 
or reduce the results of natural or manmade 
disasters or other endemic conditions such as 
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human pain, disease, hunger, or privation in 
countries or regions outside the United States. HA 
provided by US forces is generally limited in scope 
and duration; it is intended to supplement or 
complement efforts of host-nation (HN) civil 
authorities or agencies with the primary 
responsibility for providing assistance. DoD 
provides assistance when the relief need is gravely 
urgent and when the humanitarian emergency 
dwarfs the ability of normal relief agencies to 
effectively respond. 
 
M&S Considerations. M&S applications can support 
the following aspects of Humanitarian Assistance: 
 
Political and International collaboration: As shown 
in JP 3-07, HA operations are generally conducted 
in collaboration with the United Nations (UN) or 
with other multinational forces. 
 
Logistic support: The main purpose of HA 
operations is to relieve or reduce the degree of a 
given disaster in regions outside the United State. 
The objective requires a high level of logistic 
preparation and coordination. In addition a special 
logistics plan should be prepared to analyze the 
capability of the HN economy to accommodate the 
logistic support required by the US or 
multinational forces and to exercise care to limit 
adverse effects on the HN economy. 
 
Communication: There are a lot of different parties 
included in HA operations such as multinational 
forces, non-governmental groups, special 
operations forces, airlift units, etc. The success of 
the HA operation often depends upon a reliable 
and well working communication system. 
 
ROE: in many cases HA operations are conducted 
in hostile areas (like the operation PROVIDE 
CONFORT in support of Iraqi Kurds in 1991), and 
special ROE should be adopted to avoid mistakes 
that can lead to further disasters. Generally, ROE 
should be balanced between the need for security 
and restraint. 
 
Security issues. HA operations expand rapidly, 
especially in hostile zones, and became more 
complex. In cases like this, the Joint Task Force 
(JTF) is generally divided into several subordinate 
JTFs (for example one JTF provides the HA, while 
other JTF provides the security required for the 
operation). 
 
3.5 Military Support to Civil Authorities (LCDR 
Jason Bridges, US Navy) 
 
Description from JP3-07:  
Military Support to Civil Authorities (MSCA) are 
operations to provide temporary support to 
domestic civil authorities when permitted by law, 
and are normally taken when an emergency 
overtaxes the capabilities of the civil authorities. 
 
M&S Considerations. M&S can offer an extremely 
valuable tool to assist military decision makers in 
preparing for and conducting MSCA.  Historical types 
of MSCA, including disaster relief or population 
control (National Guard), as well as new potential 
military functions necessitated by the post 9/11 
security environment, can and should be modeled to 
assist in developing and refining military responses to 
domestic events, as well as strategy development and 
implementation of homeland defense requirements. 
  
Examples of functions that can be modeled include: 
• Military response to natural disasters focusing on 
logistic and transportation support to leverage 
DoD resources/expertise in disaster 
mitigation/recovery.   
• Application of military forces and technology in 
support of US Border Control to limit 
unauthorized entry into the US. 
• Development/implementation of non-lethal 
“weapons” for use in crowd-control operations. 
• Military preparation for and response to a 
Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) terrorist 
event. Functions can include: 
• Establishment of a prepositioned war reserve 
type logistics concept to position and maintain 
access to specific military equipment, 
services, and facilities for use after a WMD 
event.  This concept could include 
transportation services, medical supplies/field 
hospital components, CBR equipment, 
decontamination personnel and facilities, 
military police contingents, and other items 
deemed necessary. 
• Establishment/optimization of temporary or 
permanent WMD detection systems to 
monitor US cities or critical infrastructure for 
WMD releases, and track dispersal of an 
agent after release.  Can include 
ground/air/space based sensors. 
• Model potential dispersion and impacts of 
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• Development of triage practices to best utilize 
limited medical resources during WMD 
response operations. 
• Feasibility of military forces to conduct other 
homeland defense operations to include maritime 
interdiction operations in support of US port 
security functions, ballistic missile defense, 
CONUS air defense operations, etc… 
• Model potential communication networks to 
ensure military interoperability with domestic 
security, emergency and recovery organizations 
(i.e. FEMA). 
• Network flow model to prevent interdiction of 
critical infrastructure (power grids, transportation 
networks, water supplies, etc.). 
 
Modeling for MSCA can (and maybe should in many 
cases) be conducted by agencies outside of DoD.  
However, failure to engage DoD planners while 
developing the model will not allow the government to 
adequately reflect true capabilities and limitations that 
the military brings to MSCA. 
 
3.6 Nation Assistance/Support to 
Counterinsurgency (LDCR Patrick S. Brown, US 
Navy) 
 
Description from JP3-07: 
Nation assistance is civil or military assistance 
(other than HA) rendered to a nation by US forces 
within that nation’s territory during peacetime, 
crises or emergencies, or war, based on agreements 
mutually concluded between the United States and 
that nation. Nation assistance operations support a 
n HN by promoting sustainable development and 
growth of responsive institutions. The goal is to 
promote long-term regional stability.  Nation 
assistance programs often include, but are not 
limited to, security assistance, Foreign Internal 
Defense (FID), and Humanitarian and Civic 
Assistance (HCA). All nation assistance actions are 
integrated through the US Ambassador’s Country 
Plan.  
 
Security Assistance. Security assistance refers to a 
group of programs by which the United States 
provides defense articles, military training, and 
other defense-related services to foreign nations by 
grant, loan, credit, or cash sales in furtherance of 
national policies and objectives.  
 
Some examples of US security assistance programs 
are Foreign Military sales, Foreign Military 
Financing Program, International Military 
Education and Training Program, Economic 
Support Fund, and commercial sales licensed under 
the Arms Export Control Act.  
 
Security Assistance Surges. Security assistance 
surges accelerate release of equipment, supplies, or 
services when an allied or friendly nation faces an 
imminent military threat. Security assistance surges 
are military in nature and are focused on providing 
additional combat systems (weapons and 
equipment) or supplies, but may include the full 
range of security assistance, to include financial 
and training support. 
 
Foreign Internal Defense. FID programs 
encompass the total political, economic, 
informational, and military support provided to 
another nation to assist its fight against subversion 
and insurgency. US military support to FID should 
focus on assisting HN personnel to anticipate, 
preclude, and counter these threats. FID supports 
HN internal defense and development (IDAD) 
programs. US military involvement in FID has 
traditionally been focused on helping another 
nation defeat an organized movement attempting to 
overthrow the government. US FID programs may 
address other threats to an HN’s internal stability, 
such as civil disorder, illicit drug trafficking, and 
terrorism. These threats may, in fact, predominate 
in the future as traditional power centers shift, 
suppressed cultural and ethnic rivalries surface, 
and the economic incentives of illegal drug 
trafficking continue. US military support to FID 
may include training, materiel, advice, or other 
assistance, including direct support and combat 
operations as authorized by the National Command 
Authority (NCA), to HN forces in executing an 
IDAD program. Joint Pub 3-07.1, “JTTP for 
Foreign Internal Defense,” provides further details 
on this subject. FID is a principal special 
operations mission. For further details on special 
operations forces (SOF) involvement in FID, see 
Joint Pub 3-05, “Doctrine for Joint Special 
Operations,” and Joint Pub 3-05.3, “Joint Special 
Operations Operational Procedures.” 
 
An example of nation assistance/support to 
counterinsurgency was Operation PROMOTE 
LIBERTY, in 1990, following Operation JUST 
CAUSE in Panama. 
 
Humanitarian and civic assistance programs are 
provided under Title 10 US Code Section 401. 
This assistance is provided in conjunction with 
military operations and exercises, and must fulfill 
unit training requirements that incidentally create 
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humanitarian benefit to the local populace. In 
contrast to emergency relief conducted under HA 
operations, HCA programs generally encompass 
planned activities in the following categories: 
medical, dental, and veterinary care provided in 
rural areas of a country; construction of 
rudimentary surface transportation systems; well 
drilling and construction of basic sanitation 
facilities; and, rudimentary construction and repair 
of public facilities. 
 
M&S Considerations.  As one can see, this element of 
MOOTW covers a lot of areas.  Each of the three sub-
areas (Security Assistance, Foreign Internal Defense, 
and Humanitarian and Civic Assistance Programs) can 
represent sizeable deployments of forces and resources 
under certain scenarios.  What is clear about them all is 
that each involves a strong political element in its 
development.  In fact, each of these areas is developed 
and integrated in the U.S. Ambassador’s plan for the 
affected region and the combatant commander is really 
overseeing only one aspect of the bigger picture. This 
presents a number of interesting modeling and 
simulation challenges, since success in any of these 
areas might need to be framed in terms of political or 
social gains. 
 
From a modeling standpoint, establishing meaningful 
measures of effectiveness can be challenging.  ISSM 
and other influence models make an attempt to 
quantify the impact of taking specific actions on the 
overall perception of local citizens.  But so much of 
this is subjective.  For example, how much good will is 
engendered through the exchange of officers between 
militaries or providing graduate military education to 
international students?  What is the consequence of 
accelerating deliveries of food to an impoverished 
nation?  If there are local warlords – as in Somalia  – 
does one warlord gain an advantage over another if a 
food distribution depot is established in his 
neighborhood?  These are modeling questions which 
require a careful understanding of how entities are 
interrelated, and more importantly necessitate that 
behaviors not be treated as deterministic but pseudo-
random with certain environmental factors influencing 
the distribution of these random elements. 
 
Possible modeling and simulation techniques that seem 
particularly relevant are: 
 
Social Network Analysis.  This technique has been 
used successfully in a number of different 
applications.  Basically it helps an analyst predict 
what the effect to an adversary or ally’s social 
influence would be if certain members of their 
social network are removed, hindered, or elevated.  
A prominent example would be, what is the 
consequence upon the Iraqi insurgents if we 
capture Saddam Hussein, or all of the “deck of 
cards” leaders? 
 
Network Interdiction and Flow Modeling.  Helps 
decision makers prioritize limited resources to best 
assist a country to rebuild or defend itself.  Likely 
questions include: What is the consequence of 
building a new oil pipeline vice adding additional 
protection to the existing infrastructure?  What is 
more important, restoring power or restoring 
water? 
 
Economic modeling may be useful because it identifies 
critical elements in a country’s economic and industrial 
bases.  Resource limited countries typically lack a solid 
industrial base.  They then are forced to choose 
between supporting a military or their citizens.  Nation 
Assistance helps alleviate some of this dependence and 
allows resources to strengthen the civilian government 
and foster a culture of civilian control over its military. 
 
Training and education programs can be useful in 
preparing future peacekeepers on developing and 
implementing Rules of Engagement consistent with the 
particular scenario.  Convoy attacks, roadside bombs, 
and checkpoints are some examples where military 
forces must exhibit careful execution of their training 
to protect themselves while minimizing inadvertent 
harm to innocent civilians. 
 
Other Observations:  
“The history of failure in war can be summed up in 
two words: Too late.  Too late in comprehending 
the deadly purpose of a potential enemy; too late in 
realizing the mortal danger; too late in 
preparedness; too late in uniting all possible forces 
for resistance; too late in standing with one’s 
friends.”  -  General Douglas MacArthur 
 
The core idea in any aspect of MOOTW is to anticipate 
the enemy’s courses of action and the impacts of your 
own actions and set in motion the necessary steps to 
prevent negative consequences.  Nation 
Assistance/Support to Counterinsurgency is one type 
of preventive action taken early to prevent escalation to 
more pronounced levels of conflict.  It also emphasizes 
the host nation’s role in this process. 
 
3.7 Noncombatant Evacuation Operations (MAJ 
Larry Wittwer, US Army) 
 
Description from JP3-07: 
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These operations normally relocate threatened 
noncombatants from a foreign country. Although 
principally conducted to evacuate US citizens, 
NEOs may also include selective evacuation of 
citizens from the Host Nation as well as citizens 
from other countries. 
 
The Department of State (DOS) is responsible for 
the protection and evacuation of American citizens 
abroad and for guarding their property. The US 
Ambassador, or Chief of the Diplomatic Mission, 
is responsible for the preparation of Emergency 
Action Plans that address the military evacuation 
of US citizens and designated foreign nationals 
from a foreign country. The conduct of military 
operations to assist implementation of Emergency 
Action Plans is the responsibility of the geographic 
combatant commander. 
 
Examples of NEOs are EASTERN EXIT, 
conducted in 1991, when US and foreign national 
personnel were evacuated from Somalia, and 
QUICK LIFT, also conducted in 1991, when 
personnel were evacuated from Zaire. 
 
M&S Considerations. There seems to be two major 
aspects of NEO Operations that need to be represented 
in M&S to support training, analysis, and planning: 
 
Political and Diplomatic Maneuvering. This type of 
operation is characterized by sudden changes in a 
country’s government, reoriented political or military 
relationship with the United States, a sudden hostile 
threat to US citizens from elements within or external 
to a foreign country, or in response to a natural 
disaster. Therefore, NEO methods and timing are 
significantly influenced by diplomatic considerations.  
 
Military Operations. Under ideal circumstances there 
may be little or no opposition; however, commanders 
should anticipate opposition and plan the operation 
like any combat operation. 
 
NEOs are similar to a raid in that the operation 
involves swift insertion of a force, temporary 
occupation of objectives, and ending with a planned 
withdrawal. It differs from a raid in that force used is 
normally limited to that required to protect the 
evacuees and the evacuation force. Forces penetrating 
foreign territory to conduct a NEO should be kept to 
the minimum consistent with mission accomplishment 
by providing the security of the force and the 
extraction and protection of evacuees.  
 
As depicted in JP 3-05.1, three types of environments 
can be modeled for this type of operation: 
• Permissive environment – host country has control 
and capability to assist operations 
• Uncertain environment – host government forces 
do not have totally effective control  
• Hostile environment – hostile forces have control 
as well as the intent and capability to effectively 
oppose or react to the operations a unit intends to 
conduct 
 
Another area worth considering when modeling this 
type of operation is the correct identification of 
personnel for evacuation, along with POW operations 
if falsely identified. The logistics associated with 
establishing a Safe Haven (designated area which 
noncombatants of the United States Government’s 
responsibility and commercial vehicles and materiel 
may be evacuated during a domestic or other valid 
emergency) and Repatriation (procedure whereby 
American citizens and their families are officially 
processed back into the United States subsequent to an 
evacuation). 
 
3.8 Peace Operations (Command Sgt Major Steven 
Burnett, US Army (ret)) 
 
Description from JP3-07: 
Peace Operations are military operations to support 
diplomatic efforts to reach a long-term political 
settlement and categorized as peacekeeping 
operations (PKO) and peace enforcement 
operations (PEO). PO are conducted in conjunction 
with the various diplomatic activities necessary to 
secure a negotiated truce and resolve the conflict. 
Additional types of MOOTW (e.g., HA and NEO) 
may complement peace operations. Military PO are 
tailored to each situation and may be conducted in 
support of diplomatic activities before, during, or 
after conflict.  
 
Peacekeeping Operations. PKO are military 
operations undertaken with the consent of all major 
parties to a dispute, designed to monitor and 
facilitate implementation of an agreement (cease 
fire, truce, or other such agreements) and support 
diplomatic efforts to reach a long-term political 
settlement. An example of PKO is the US 
commitment to the Multinational Force Observers 
in the Sinai since 1982.  
 
Peace Enforcement Operations. PEO are the 
application of military force, or threat of its use, 
normally pursuant to international authorization, to 
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compel compliance with resolutions or sanctions 
designed to maintain or restore peace and order. 
PEO missions include intervention operations, as 
well as operations to restore order, enforce 
sanctions, forcibly separate belligerents, and 
establish and supervise exclusion zones for the 
purpose of establishing an environment for truce or 
cease-fire. Unlike PKO, such operations do not 
require the consent of the states involved or of 
other parties to the conflict. Examples of PEO are 
Operation POWER PACK conducted in the 
Dominican Republic in 1965 and the secondary 
effort in Somalia (UNITAF), 1992-1993. 
 
M&S Considerations. The development of models 
and simulations that accurately capture and possibly 
predict the truth about the two PO missions (PKO 
and PEO) seems to be exactly what the M&S 
community is attempting to do now. PKO may be 
easier to model and design simulations for since this 
mission is better defined than the PEO missions. PEO 
is undertaken with the understanding that war 
fighting and peace keeping may be simultaneous 
depending on location which, as Operation Iraqi 
Freedom (OIF) has shown, may be street corner to 
street corner. The components necessary for MS 
considerations for each mission may be: 
 
Diplomatic. Political and diplomatic efforts require a 
mix of state and military aspects. Modeling these 
mixtures require that the M&S community now start to 
implement cultural as well as political dynamics into 
models. Unlike warfare where the underlying 
algorithms can bring some preciseness to a solution, 
development of human behavior algorithms may never 
reach that precision. This said, cultural dimensions 
must be given some attention. The other JP3-07 
operations all have the political aspect and others have 
stated clearly that M&S development is vague as to the 
interaction between military and civilian agencies. It 
seems impractical to develop deterministic M&S 
platforms so the possibilities presented by agent based 
platforms are certainly worth investigation. The Project 
Albert approach of simple models executed many 
times may be a means to develop more sophisticated 
M&S platforms instead of the method used now of 
pouring tens or even hundreds of millions of dollars 
into complex simulations that neither work nor give an 
accurate picture of the reality of the political nature of 
peace. The example here is the model that predicted 
that the Iraqi citizens would open their arms to 
American intervention when in truth divisions of 
assault forces immediately went into PEO in places 
like Ah Nasariyah. 
 
Military. With the development of Effects Based 
Operations doctrine, current M&S platforms lack the 
robustness to seamlessly model these rapid transitions. 
The Millennium Challenge lessons learned 
dramatically indicate that leaders who were to focused 
on complex operation design missed the simple. In PO 
this is a primary concern for the M&S community. 
How to develop M&S platforms that capture the rapid 
transitions in MOOTW while still providing a 
common understandable operating picture? Again, the 
advance of agent based platforms seems to be a viable 
direction to proceed. The cultural aspect of PO, 
whether PKO or PEO, is a primary concern as the last 
two years months in Afghanistan and Iraq have 
displayed. Only in Bosnia have the M&S models 
begun to provide some robustness in the outputs and 
unfortunately are still primarily US force based. 
 
Other Considerations. The collaboration across the 
M&S, Human Factors and other disciplines is 
encouraging. It is apparent that no one discipline can 
fully answer the demands of the military and political 
agencies to provide accurate and predictive 
evaluations of world instabilities where US and Allied 
forces may be called to intervene. History has shown 
that good intentions needlessly cost the lives of the 
young men and women who are involved in the PO 
missions due to inaccurate or poor planning. All 
indications are that worldwide deployment is an 
evolving mission. The development of a NATO 
reaction force tested and certified by the Allied 
Warrior exercise may be an excellent arena to develop 
this collaborative design. 
 
3.9 Protection of Shipping (LT Brian Jones,  USNR) 
 
Description from JP3-07: 
US forces provide protection for US Citizens and 
their property on US or foreign vessels against 
unlawful violence in or over international waters. 
This protection can include coastal sea control, 
harbor defense, port security, countermine 
operations and environmental defense. This will 
require the coordinated effort of surface, air, 
subsurface and space units, sensors and weapons. 
A command structure, both afloat and ashore, is 
required, as is a logistics base. 
 
Area operations are designed to prevent hostile 
forces from gaining tactical positions where attacks 
against shipping can occur. If an area operation 
cannot neutralize the threat, the next step is escort 
operations. Mine countermeasures operations are 
crucial to successful shipping protection and are an 
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essential element of escort operations. 
Environmental defense provides a response for 
major environmental incidents around the world.  
 
M&S Considerations. Modeling and simulation can 
help out protection of shipping in many ways. M&S 
can be used to help forces determine where a hostile 
force may try to gain tactical advantage over shipping 
lanes. It can also help us to determine how large a 
force will be needed to maintain control over that area 
or take that area over if our forces are too late. There 
are already models of ships conducting a search 
pattern; this can be adapted for mine countermeasure 
operations. We can also use M&S to determine how 
many and where to place escort ships for group escort 
operations. 
 
3.10 Recovery Operations (Curtis Blais, instructor) 
 
Description from JP3-07: 
Recovery operations are conducted to search for, 
locate, identify, rescue, and return personnel or 
human remains, sensitive equipment, or items 
critical to national security. These operations are 
generally sophisticated activities requiring detailed 
planning in order to execute them, especially when 
conducting them in denied areas. They may be 
clandestine, covert, or overt. Other recovery 
operations may be conducted in friendly areas, 
particularly when the Host-Nation does not have 
the means to provide technical assistance in 
conducting the recovery. An example of a recovery 
operation is OPERATION FULL ACCOUNTING 
conducted to account for and recover the remains 
of US service members lost during the Vietnam 
War. 
 
M&S Considerations. There seems to be two major 
aspects of Recovery Operations that need to be 
represented in M&S to support training, analysis, and 
planning: (1) political and diplomatic negotiations and 
maneuvering – before recovery by military means are 
attempted, or even to set the stage for such operations, 
diplomacy would be the first resort; (2) military 
operations -- e.g., special operations team insertion 
and mission execution. 
 
Regarding the diplomacy aspect, there is an emphasis 
in JP 3-07 on ensuring all military personnel 
understand the political objective and potential impact 
of inappropriate actions. It is not clear to me the role 
that the military may play in diplomatic negotiations, 
but it may be the case that military leaders are close 
advisors to those conducting the negotiations in order 
to identify and consider all options. On the political 
side, influence games along the lines of the SimCity 
genre can help reveal political influences present in 
the situation that need to be carefully managed and 
possibly manipulated to bring about the desired result. 
Different types of "what could go wrong" scenarios 
can be initiated to stimulate the users. These might be 
useful exercises for military leaders to make them 
more aware of the intricacies and sensitivities of 
diplomacy. 
 
In some sense, the challenge to M&S for Recovery 
Operations is somewhat simpler on the military 
operations side. Here we can apply capabilities that 
are fairly well established in the community, from 
command staff level simulations for general mission 
planning and exercise conduct to first-person shooter 
level games for detailed "walk-through" of the mission 
on the ground. A complication comes in the possible 
need for insertion teams to communicate with civilians 
or other factions during the conduct of the mission, 
and the interplay of ongoing diplomatic efforts while 
the operation is taking place. This can require a 
sophisticated "marrying" of the different levels of 
gaming and simulation to represent the information 
flow that would be occurring (possibly through 
communication, even if infrequent, from the team or 
through such means as satellite/UAV imagery) in the 
real world as the operation is underway. Such an 
environment might be able to create some measure of 
trepidation/stress in the participants through the drama 
and intensity of the situation -- highlighting the idea of 
tactical decision-making under stress (TADMUS) 
investigated over the past several years.[14] 
 
Other Observations. It is interesting to note that JP 
3-07 provides some guidance regarding the training 
required to address MOOTW (refer to [1] Figure IV-6, 
page IV-14). It separates education and training 
considerations into goals and methods for (1) Officers 
and NCOs (ensure all leaders understand the 
objectives, principles, and characteristics of MOOTW 
through discussions, lessons learned, and situational 
exercises); (2) individuals, units, and staffs (ensure 
individuals and units have the necessary skills for a 
given MOOTW and that the staffs can plan, control, 
and support the operation through individual skill 
training, situational exercises, field exercises, 
combined arms live fire exercises, mobility exercises, 
and simulation exercises). M&S can play a role in 
several of these areas, particularly through various 
levels of exercises and possibly individual skill 
training through use of virtual environments. 
 
3.11 Show of Force Operations (CPT Michael 
Martin, US Army) 
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Description from JP3-07: 
These operations, designed to demonstrate US 
resolve, involve increased visibility of US 
deployed forces in an attempt to defuse a specific 
situation that if allowed to continue may be 
detrimental to US interests or national objectives. 
As an example of a show of force, Operation JTF-
Philippines was conducted by US forces in 1989 in 
support of President Aquino during a coup attempt 
against the Philippine government. A more recent 
example was Operation Desert Thunder, a build up 
of forces on the Iraqi Border in late 1997. Another 
ongoing example of these operations is the military 
exercises conducted by North Korean forces in and 
around the De-Militarized Zone (DMZ). 
 
M&S Considerations. Show of Force Operations 
seem to be primarily political operations. They provide 
political leverage which may work for or against the 
interests being simulated. As far as military simulations 
are concerned, a show of force operation is almost 
exclusively a logistical operation with security aspects.  
 
From the political or diplomatic aspect, Show of Force 
Operations attempt to increase regional 
influence, and demonstrate resolve to use military 
force. In the narrow scope of this operation, this is 
done without any military interaction with hostile 
forces. Diplomatically, the act can strengthen the threat 
of hostilities. This can have a two edged effect. The 
political posturing and attempts to undermine friendly 
efforts in a region may be cowed; however, unstable 
situations may be pushed into open conflict by the 
increased presence of military forces. It seems that 
communication would be an important aspect to 
capture for this operation. In effect, the ideal Show of 
Force Operation would be telegraphed to unstable 
hostile forces so that they perceive the operation as a 
demonstration, rather than a preparation for hostilities. 
However, security concerns dictate that the 
“telegraphing” be done judiciously. Recurring joint 
exercises with regional militaries, like Operation 
Bright Star, provide a non-threatening method of 
conducting Show of Force Operations. The size of the 
force used in the operation would also be directly 
proportional to the strength of its effect on the given 
regional situation. 
 
From the military aspect, Show of Force Operations 
may lead up to initial starting conditions for other 
military operations. For example, the deployment of 
elements of the US Army’s 3rd Infantry Division 
(Mech) in the Gulf Region for Bright Star Operations 
prior to OIF led directly to their participation as one of 
the major initial elements in the start of OIF. During 
the conduct of the operations, forces also expose 
themselves to potential attack, as they are, by nature of 
the operation, moved closer to hostile forces, bringing 
them often within potential striking range. This is a 
potential feedback loop into the Diplomatic/Political 
arena. If forces are successfully attacked while 
deployed, repercussions may either limit or increase 
the potential for future operations, given the public, 
political, and diplomatic interpretations of the actions. 
At the military simulation level, this becomes a very 
high fidelity model, where the actions of a few 
individuals can have strategic influence. The downside 
of this kind of exercise is that, if the “blue force” is 
successful, it’s not a very interesting exercise. 
 
3.12 Strikes and Raids (Maj James McDonough, 
USMC) 
 
Description from JP3-07:  
Strikes are offensive operations conducted to 
inflict damage on, seize, or destroy an objective for 
political purposes. Strikes may be used for 
punishing offending nations or groups, upholding 
international law, or preventing those nations or 
groups from launching their own offensive actions. 
A raid is usually a small-scale operation involving 
swift penetration of hostile territory to secure 
information, confuse the enemy, or destroy 
installations. It ends with a planned withdrawal 
upon completion of the assigned mission. An 
example of a strike is Operation URGENT FURY, 
conducted on the island of Grenada in 1983. An 
example of a raid is Operation EL DORADO 
CANYON conducted against Libya in 1986, in 
response to the terrorist bombing of US Service 
members in Berlin. Joint Pub 3-02, “Joint Doctrine 
for Amphibious Operations,” provides specific 
guidance on amphibious raids. 
 
M&S Considerations. This may be the area of 
MOOTW that most closely matches conventional 
warfare. Strikes and raids have been modeled at all 
levels of simulation for training, analysis, and 
planning. Although the actual raid or strike can be 
easily modeled, the challenge for current simulations is 
placing this short duration action in an overall 
MOOTW setting. Different from traditional combat, 
MOOTW involves the selective use of force. Being 
able to create the environment where decisionmakers 
have to make decisions to carry out a raid or strike may 
be the bigger challenge than actually modeling the raid 
or strike itself. 
One area where better simulation support is required is 
in the area of mission planning. Specifically, the ability 
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to conduct mission planning afloat or enroute to the 
Area of Operations (AO) on mission specific terrain. If 
the leaders at all levels can virtually walk through the 
specific terrain they are about to operate on prior to 
conducting a raid or strike, they will be more prepared 
for this specific mission. Since strikes and raids are 
normally limited in scope, the ability to quickly 
produce small but accurate digital terrain based on 
satellite or UAV imagery should be possible. The 
issues that arise and need to be tested involve asking 
the question: What is good enough? When representing 
urban terrain, how detailed do the buildings need to 
be? Do they need to be identical inside and out (yes, 
for the objective), or just typical for the region? 
 
3.13 Support to Insurgency (MAJ Jason Jones, US 
Army) 
 
Description from JP3-07:   
Support to insurgency is an organized movement 
aimed at the overthrow of a constituted 
government through the use of subversion and 
armed conflict. The US government may support 
an insurgency against a regime threatening US 
interests. US forces may provide logistics and 
training support to an insurgency, but normally do 
not themselves conduct combat operations. An 
example of support to insurgency was US support 
to the Mujahadin resistance in Afghanistan during 
the Soviet invasion. 
  
Specific types of operations that US forces can 
assist insurgents with include: intelligence 
gathering; surreptitious insertion; sabotage; 
subversion; linkup; evasion and escape; 
institutional and infrastructure development; 
psychological operations; resupply operations; and 
recruitment, organization, training, and equipping a 
force to perform guerrilla warfare. 
 
M&S Considerations. M&S for the Support to 
Insurgency mission doesn’t differ greatly from 
supporting special operations forces in the field for 
many of the above listed areas. Regardless of 
whether the mission is conducted using special 
operations forces or other government agents (i.e. 
CIA), their actions and effects will be similar to 
traditional military actions/events. 
 
Where these actions vary significantly from traditional 
military actions are in the areas of sabotage; 
institutional and infrastructure development; and 
preparing a force for guerilla warfare. Each of these 
areas requires a very high degree of subtlety (a high 
degree of model resolution) in their execution and in 
their effects on the operational environment. 
 
Sabotage. Defined as the destruction of property or 
obstruction of normal operations.6 The challenge with 
sabotage is modeling to the degree of resolution where 
(1) the target of sabotage is represented in the model 
and (2) the effects of the sabotage are accurately 
portrayed. What is the affect on a foreign government 
if insurgent forces sever power to a low-hanging draw 
bridge on a major commercial water way? The bridge 
is still functional but maritime traffic is now blocked. 
 
Institutional and Infrastructure Development. This is 
possibly the more SimCity-like aspect of the mission 
with the exception that this work must be done 
covertly. The effect of developing parts of the country 
covertly would be challenging to model for both the 
direct result of development and then modeling the 
government’s response to these changes in their 
people. 
 
Preparing a Force for Guerilla Warfare. While my 
knowledge of military and diplomatic simulations is 
quite limited, I cannot think of a simulation that 
models the recruiting, organizing and training of a 
guerilla force. While many real time strategy games 
force you to spend time and effort doing similar 
things, they don’t begin to approach the complexities 
associated with reality. 
 
4. Class Projects 
The culmination of course activities was an end-of-
quarter project.  The students were instructed to select 
a problem of interest relevant to the various MOOTW 
missions that had been studied and explored during the 
course.  Their work needed to reflect the typical steps 
in an analysis; namely: (1) select a problem of interest 
and state the problem; (2) describe the operational 
scenario for conduct of a study; (3) define measures of 
effectiveness or measures of performance to be 
computed in the study; (4) design an experiment, 
reflecting nearly-orthogonal Latin hypercube 
techniques documented in [15] for dealing with high-
dimensional response surfaces (i.e., many factors, 
many levels); (5) select a model (e.g., ISSM, 
DIAMOND, Pythagoras, MANA, etc.) to support 
conduct of the study; (6) represent the scenario in the 
chosen model; (7) execute the model and collect data 
(at a minimum, given time constraints, execute a 
number of runs to provide demonstration of the 
soundness of the scenario implementation); (8) 
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perform analysis of the data and report results (to the 
extent possible under time constraints); (9) report 
conclusions, recommendations for follow-on work, 
lessons learned, and comments on the course, including 
a critique (benefits, limitations) of the model(s) used in 
the study.   
 
Brief overviews of the projects are provided below.  
The student reports, including any simulation scenario 
files developed, have been delivered separately and are 
available on request. 
 
4.1 Parameter-Generation for Modeling Statbility 
and Support Operations with Analytical Models 
and Aggregate Simulations (LT Arne Baggesen, 
German Navy) 
 
Most military simulations and mathematical models of 
combat or non-combat situations contain descriptions 
of system capabilities and performance parameters that 
were not determined by considering variations of 
doctrine and human behavior. Implementation of 
human behavior is a key factor in many analyses for 
Support and Stability Operations, but it is hard to 
implement in generic models due to the lack of 
modeling of behavioral variability. This project 
describes the modeling separation of scenario-
independent structure and scenario-dependent 
parameters and illustrates the concept using an 
example problem for interactive elements of a 
detection-problem. 
 
Functional parameters in a model represent system 
capabilities, environmental parameters, tactics, and 
other behavioral interactions. These can be generated 
by simple agent-based interaction models of parts 
(modules) of the whole setting. The second analysis 
step uses these functional parameters in a mathematical 
model or low resolution, aggregated simulation. This 
process provides tractable results and better insights in 
functional dependencies as well as improved execution 
speed and a modular design for scenario-dependent 
analysis elements. The analysis method can therefore 
be best described as a hybrid approach that yields a 
maximum of flexibility and reusability while limiting 
programming efforts by using commercially available 
products. 
 
4.2 Application of Pythagoras to the Evaluation of 
Shipboard Anti-Terrorism/Force Protection 
Measures in Response to Small Boat Attack (LCDR 
Jason Bridges, USN) 
 
On October 12, 2000, while refueling in the port of 
Aden, Yemen USS COLE (DDG 67) was attacked by 
an explosive-laden small craft.  The attack resulted in 
the loss of seventeen sailors, and neutralized COLE’s 
combat capability.  As a result, an exhaustive review of 
shipboard force protection measures has henceforth 
been conducted, resulting in improved Anti-
Terrorism/Force Protection plans and training 
throughout the Navy.  This project explores notional 
force protection measures to evaluate a ship’s ability to 
prevent a similar attack to that conducted on the 
COLE.   Figure 3 shows the initial simulation 






Figure 3. Pierside Anti-Terrorism/Force Protection 
Scenario Set-up (annotated Pythagoras screen shot) 
 
4.3 Application of the DIAMOND Model in 
Expanding and Interdicting Iraqi Oil 
Infrastructure (LCDR Shane Brown, US Navy) 
 
The economies of the world require a stable flow of oil 
to fuel their growth and productivity.  World demand 
for this valuable resource currently stands at 
approximately 79.5 million barrels per day, with a third 
of that demand flowing from countries surrounding the 
Persian Gulf. Collectively these nations supply 
upwards of 27 percent of the worldwide oil demand 
(including 22 percent of U.S. imports) and possess 
approximately two thirds of the world’s proven 
reserves. Iraq has the world’s third largest proven 
reserves (and will likely move up the list of oil-
producing nations to become the second largest once 
additional exploration is completed). Despite its 
sizeable reserves, Iraq has not sustained rates above 3 
million barrels per day for any significant period of 
time since the 1979 Iran-Iraq War.  In addition, the 
majority of Iraq’s 4,300-mile pipeline system has 
suffered from poor maintenance and the effects of a 
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The focus of this project is investigation of advantages 
and difficulties in implementing an optimal interdiction 
and capital expansion model into a simulation 
environment. In present day Iraq, U.S. forces and Iraqi 
nationals are engaged in an ongoing struggle against an 
enemy whose tactics are comparable to those of other 
guerrilla forces around the world. In particular, attacks 
against the oil infrastructure continue to occur with 
steady regularity across many parts of the globe. Even 
in the United States the defense of key infrastructure 
has taken on renewed interest since September 11, 
2001, and remains an important subject area for any 
discussion on military operations other than war. 
 
Figure 4 shows a map of Iraq overlaid with the arc-
node network defined in DIAMOND to represent the 
Iraqi oil pipeline and processing network. Data 
obtained from optimization models are used to tune the 
parameters of the flow rates across this network. 
 
 
Figure 4. DIAMOND Arc-Node Network for Study of 
the Iraqi Oil Infrastructure (DIAMOND screen shot) 
 
4.4 Comparison of War Fighters to Peace Enablers 
during Community Stabilizing Operations 
(Command Sgt Maj Steve Burnett, US Army (ret)) 
 
Stability and Sustainment Operations (SASO) require 
military forces to quickly adapt behavior based on the 
varying states of stability within the urban community 
of operations.  This unpredictable environment often 
requires the military members to alternate between two 
different states; the war fighter and the peace enabler.  
Current military training focuses on war fighter skill 
more than peace enabler in a majority of the military 
operational specialties for all services.  The lack of 
training for stabilization operations for these forces 
requires that units quickly learn adaptive behavior to 
respond correctly to these situations during SASO 
missions.  This project investigates this problem by 
examining agent behavior modeled in two scenarios 
created in the Project Albert Pythagoras Model. 
Scenario One focus investigates the impact on stability 
in a notional community when a specialized peace 
enabling force is involved in stability operations.  
Scenario Two investigates a war fighter force in the 
same situation.  Figure 5 provides a picture of the 
urban environment used for the study.  
 
 
Figure 5. Peace-keeping Scenario Set-up for 
Comparison of War Fighters to Peace Enablers 
(Pythagoras screen shot) 
 
Analysis of the model indicated that community 
stabilization is achieved and maintained more 
effectively with a force composed of specialty trained 
peace enablers rather than a single force of war 
fighters.   The statistical analysis is weak due to the 
difficulty of converting “color” in Pythagoras into a 
measure of aggressiveness. The project paper describes 
the strengths and weaknesses of the model and offers 
recommendations for future work.  
 
4.5 Evaluating Sunni Participation in an Election in 
a Representative Iraqi Town Using the PAX Model 
(1st LT Suat Kursat Gun, Turkish Army) 
 
One of the most important factors that decision makers 
should keep in mind is that the MOEs that are suitable 
for conventional war are not suitable for peace support 
operations. Each peace support operation has its unique 
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goal; therefore, each experiment on peace support 
operations must have its unique MOEs. In peace 
support operations, it is as important to carry out the 
mission with no use of force as it is to carry out the 
mission successfully. If it is necessary to use force, use 
it for self protection. Protection of the election process 
is a form of peace support operation which requires its 
own techniques.  As the Peace Support Unit (PSU) 
commander, the factors that one can control are 
limited. This study looks at different methods for 
securing a polling place in an environment where there 
is high potential for disruption by disenfranchised 
parties. Figure 6 depicts a particular polling place 
arrangement used in the study. 
 
 
Figure 6. Election Polling Place Configuration (PAX 
screen shot) 
 
4.6 Protection of Shipping Using the MANA 
Combat Model Distribution 3.0.39 (LT Brian Jones, 
US Navy) 
 
US forces provide protection against unlawful violence 
in or over international waters for US citizens and their 
property on US or foreign vessels.  This protection can 
include coastal sea control, harbor defense, port 
security, countermine operations and environmental 
defense. The operations require the coordinated effort 
of surface, air, subsurface and space units, sensors and 
weapons. A command structure, both afloat and 
ashore, is required, as is a logistics base. This project 
uses MANA (version 3.0.39) to create a model of a 
waterway chokepoint through which a convoy of ships 
must pass to reach their goal. On the far side of the 
choke point is a group of small boats patrolling the 
chokepoint waters and harassing all ships that come 
into contact with their patrol. 
 
 
Figure 7. Waterway Chokepoint Scenario for 
Protection of Shipping Study 
 
4.7 Effectiveness of Border Patrol at Capturing 
Illegal Border Crossers (Maj Jason M. Jones, US 
Army) 
 
This project begins to open the door into using 
simulation to study border security techniques. The 
“battlefield” contains two agent teams: those 
attempting to cross a non-delimited border and a group 
attempting to catch those crossing or moving away 
from the border.  The project uses MANA (version 
3.0.39) to build the scenario and provide the agents 
their motives.  The terrain approximates desert 
conditions and includes a river with areas of increased 
vegetation and concealment (Figure 8). Crossing 
agents (three squads of ten agents each) are challenged 
by restrictions on movement due to terrain types, but 
have caches available for “refuel.” These caches are 
obscured from casual view by the border patrols, but 
can possibly be discovered and destroyed. The patrols 
(three three-man squads) are equipped with a reaction 
force (two vehicles) and three ground mounted sensors. 
The challenge for the patrols is their relatively small 
numbers compared to the crossers. The simulation has 
a relatively simple sequence for the two sides to 
execute, but the possibilities for their actions and the 
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Figure 8. Border Crossing Scenario Set-up (MANA 
screen shot) 
 
4.8 Modeling Interactions between Insurgents and 
Civilian Protesters (CPT Michael Martin, US 
Army) 
 
The purpose of this project is to study interactions 
between military, civilian, and insurgent forces to 
consider the dynamics of the use of force and creation 
of insurgent sympathizers. The situation modeled is 
based on incidents in and around Fallujah in April, 
2003.7 A Coalition unit in Fallujah opened fire upon a 
crowd of protesters who had assembled in the city. In 
the months following that incident, the majority of 
anti-coalition attacks taken in the area were committed 
by people who either themselves had been injured in 
the incident or were related to people who had been. 
The project investigates the ability of a tool like 
Pythagoras to model the side-changing or mind-state 
changing effect that being involved in such an incident 
can have on a population. A further interest is 
consideration of cultural aspects which could have 
mitigated the effects of this incident. 
 
The scenario set-up (see Figure 9) includes four types 
of agents: (1) blue agents representing Coalition forces 
occupying a school complex in downtown Al Fallujah; 
(2) red agents representing insurgents, who seek to 
attack the Coalition forces; (3) green agents 
representing neutral civilians and broken into two 
squads, one consisting of protesters who are marching 
around the school compound and the second consisting 
of civilians who live in the local area; (4) an Agitator 
agent that is neutral, and so will not be attacked by 
Coalition forces, but who has a 1% chance of 
converting neutral civilians into insurgents. The 
                                                          
7 http://www.msnbc.com/news/988786.asp?0bl=-0 
scenario begins with no Agitators: If a neutral or 
insurgent agent is injured, it then turns into an 
Agitator, and Agents can be injured either by direct fire 
or by being hit by the radii of weapons effects 
(innocent bystander effect).  
 
 
Figure 9. Civil Unrest Scenario Set in Fallujah 
(MANA screen shot) 
 
4.9 Application of MANA to an Embassy Security 
Mission (Maj J. P. McDonough, USMC) 
 
This project considers use of MANA to model 
scenarios involving situations that can be encountered 
by Marine Security Guard (MSG) Detachments  while 
providing security at US Embassies around the world.  
By running multiple scenarios with different force 
compositions the model may provide some insight into 
the threats and possible ways to counter them. An 
example embassy compound constructed for the study 
is shown in Figure 10. 
 
 
Figure 10. Embassy Security Scenario  
(MANA screen shot) 
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4.10 Application of MANA to Surveillance of 
Fishing Zones in the Norwegian Sea (Ole Jakob 
Sendstad, Norway) 
 
The traditional way to simulate military forces has 
been dominated by attrition based models, based on 
Lanchester’s equations or similar, where typically the 
behavior of the force units is scripted. This 
“mechanical model” of military forces is not so 
applicable in a MOOTW scenario, where each unit’s 
actions can strongly affect the situation. This project 
considers a peacetime surveillance operation in the 
Norwegian Sea by means of Coast Guard vessels. 
Fishing vessels in the region are trying to maximize 
their profit by performing beneficial fishing, while the 
Coast Guard is concerned with protecting maritime 
boundaries to prevent illegal fishing. Figure 11 is a 
depiction of a notional area of interest for the study. 
 
 
Figure 11. Surveillance and Enforcement of Maritime 
Boundaries (MANA screen shot) 
 
4.11 Effects of Force Concentration in Military 
Operations Other Than War (Maj Mounir Sidhom, 
Tunisian Air Force)  
 
Many MOOTW efforts such as Humanitarian 
Assistance (HA) or Peace Keeping Operations (PKO) 
are conducted in hostile areas where insurgents are still 
active. Even though the military forces are well 
prepared for these kinds of operations, casualties are 
often an inevitable effect, especially when insurgents 
are mixed with the civilian population. However, 
research has shown that appropriate tactics, techniques, 
and procedures (TTP) can be used to reduce the 
number of casualties in our forces. This project focuses 
on variation in the concentration of forces in 
conducting such operations. Two scenarios (parallel 
and serial force operations) are analyzed to investigate 
which one provides mission success at minimal cost in 
own force casualties. Figure 12 illustrates the area of 
operations consisting of a number of villages to which 
the forces need to provide HA. 
 
 
Figure 12. Scenario Set-up for Study of Force 
Concentration Supporting Humanitarian Assistance 
Operations (MANA screen shot) 
 
4.12 Modeling Non-Lethal Weapons in OneSAF 
Objective System (OOS) (MAJ Nick Wittwer, US 
Army) 
 
The US Military has an ever increasing role to conduct 
peacekeeping (SASO) and urban operations (UO or 
Military Operations in Urban Terrain – MOUT).  
Conventional forces (military, police, or international 
peacekeeping) armed only with traditional weapons 
normally have only two options for effecting 
compliance: maintain a presence (passive) or employ 
deadly force (active). These two extremes have 
virtually no middle ground. The reluctance of military 
and/or peacekeeping forces to impose their will 
through the use of deadly force creates a critical 
vulnerability.  This vulnerability needs to be addressed 
to better ensure the safety of military and peacekeeping 
forces.  These forces require a safe yet persuasive and 
effective alternative to deadly force while still 
possessing lethal means. This project explores the 
ability to model non-lethal weapons, such as the 
XM1014 Joint Service Shotgun (using non-lethal 
munitions), in the developmental OneSAF Objective 
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System (OOS). The ultimate objective is to begin 
evaluating non-lethal weapon (NLW) systems and 
munitions most suited for the US Army. One of several 




Figure 13. Scenario Set-up for Assessing Effectiveness 
of Non-Lethal Weapons (OOS screen shot) 
 
4. Lessons Learned 
 
The major challenge in conducting this course was the 
complexity of some of the models and tools 
introduced.  DIAMOND and ISSM in particular are 
difficult for the students to learn and operate in a short 
period of time.  Availability of clear and simple 
tutorials to walk through operation of these products 
would be very helpful in this type of setting.  
Pythagoras and MANA, in contrast, were very easy for 
the students to understand. The contrast here is 
important, and necessary. DIAMOND and ISSM 
provide much broader capabilities than Pythagoras and 
MANA, even though the latter two models can be used 
for modeling a variety of scenarios and situations. 
Functional capabilities of Pythagoras and MANA are 
relatively few and generally intuitive to these students 
(given their military backgrounds). However, part of 
the value of introducing DIAMOND and ISSM is their 
very nature; that is, they represent many of the 
complexities of the MOOTW environment that are 
important to expose to the students. From this 
perspective, future instruction of this nature needs to 
include DIAMOND and ISSM as was done in this 
course, but development of additional tutorial materials 
to make the instruction easier would be useful. 
 
Also, in retrospect, more time should be devoted to 
design and conduct of an actual analysis using one or 
more of the tools. It is important for the students to see 
a “start-to-finish” example so they can have better 
opportunity to work through the steps of a complete 
analysis in their project work. This will also better 
prepare them for follow-on thesis work or application 
of the tools in future military assignments.  
 
5. Conclusions and Recommendations 
The FAST Toolbox provides a unique capability for 
introduction of MOOTW challenges in the instruction 
and training of military analysts. The M&S for 
MOOTW course introduced at NPS was designed to 
explore issues, challenges, and opportunities for 
application of modeling and simulation to MOOTW.  
The course considered application of M&S for 
MOOTW from the perspectives of analysis, training, 
acquisition, and mission planning/rehearsal. Of critical 
importance to the course, students were given hands-on 
experience with a number of current and emerging 
simulations and computational tools relevant to 
MOOTW.  
During the time the course was conducted, the 
MOOTW FAST Toolbox development team supported 
a real-world study for the Joint Chiefs of Staff J-8. 
This effort generated an integrated analysis 
methodology that employed several of the models and 
tools to provide study outcomes.[1] The M&S for 
MOOTW course is an excellent venue for introducing 
future military analysts to the integrated analysis 
methodology. Instruction and student investigations 
can both assess and improve the methodology as it is 
being employed in the course. A major challenge is 
reaching sufficient proficiency in operation of the 
models and understanding of the methodology for the 
students to be able to design and conduct studies. One 
approach may be to walk the students through a 
prepared study that applies the methodology, possibly 
with missing portions requiring the students to think 
through model inputs and outputs to determine how 
they would fill the gap. Such an exercise may 
sufficiently prepare them to then attempt a simplified 
integrated analysis on their own. 
 
Overall, the course was considered a success by the 
people who count the most, the students. It is 
recommended that this course be taught again, but with 
inclusion of the integrated analysis methodology 
pioneered by the MOOTW FAST Toolbox 
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